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Discussion After the Speeches of William W. Falsgraf and
Roger Cotton*
QUESTION, Professor King: Bill, you mentioned 189 substances
that are considered offensive. Does this particularization of U.S. legislation and regulation create a continuing need for review of these regulations? Are there dangers in the U.S. approach?
ANSWER, Mr. Falsgraf: This is the first time of which I'm aware
that Congress has gotten into the micromanagement of the environmental system. The answer to your question is "yes"; you have a great danger when you list 189 substances. Maybe there are 189 more that ought
to be there, and Congress just didn't know about them. What they tried
to do is say that these are the minimum - the 189 that must be addressed - and then leave it up to the EPA to study the situation and add
as many more as its thinks are appropriate. Typically, in an administrative system, it is up to the Agency to identify the items to be controlled.
QUESTION, Professor King: Could you discuss the common law
the trespass, nuisance and other actions that were mentioned - versus the statutory approach to environmental suits?
ANSWER, Mr. Cotton: I would say that statutory law has somewhat overtaken the common law. If you look back fifteen years, we had
more environmental suits using those common law principles than we do
today. That's due, I think, to the fact that the government has taken on
many of the actions that citizens were earlier forced to prosecute. We
have, in Ontario, over 2,000 charges a year actively proceeding against
corporate officers and directors, as well as companies. We recently had a
fine of $300,000 against a battery company. That was unheard of ten to
fifteen years ago. If you had a $5,000 fine, that was significant in those
days.
I remember very well a case where there was a $1 fine, and there was
a fine splitting provision in the legislation, so the people who brought the
prosecution only got fifty cents. We've come a long way from that. In a
sense, the environmentalists' governments of the day have taken over the
need for the use of these common law actions. It will be interesting to see
whether bills of rights, new rights to citizens and removing some of the
barriers to citizen lawsuits will change.
COMMENT, Mr. Falsgraf: When you have private contribution
actions and so forth in the U.S., you always see a laundry list of common
-
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law actions. Rarely do those take over the conduct of the litigation. The
litigation is almost always resolved in the context of the statutory provisions, because they give a lot more power to the plaintiff. It's easier to
bring a case under Superfund than it is under the traditional concepts of
nuisance and trespass.
QUESTION, Mr. Erdilek: The way I understand it, pollution allowances or credits are allocated, and these become bankable or tradeable among companies, subject to maximum limits. Is there a tradeoff
among different types of substances or emissions for a given plant? Is
there a tradeoff among the regions in which a given company operates,
supposing that it has multiple plants? Finally, do these credits or limits
apply to new plants and to old plants equally?
ANSWER, Mr. Falsgraf: First of all, the system only applies to
SO 2, with some minor exceptions; there was some trading of emissions
limits in connection with PSD permits, but put that aside. The SO2 credits are assigned on the basis of existing plants and what those plants
would be allowed to emit, given the amount of BTU input based historically in a given time frame, at a given rate of emission. The idea is that if
they do better than that - if, for example, they can reduce their SO 2
emissions to 1.2 pounds per million BTU of input when they're only required to be at 2.5 pounds per million BTU of input - then that incremental amount is what they can either bank for their own use or sell. It
doesn't apply to toxins.
As to your second question, tradeoffs between multiple plants in different regions, the system is set up so that you can trade the credits
around and use them wherever you like.
QUESTION, Mr. Erdilek: What do you think of the system?
ANSWER, Mr. Falsgraf: It's too early. The supposition is that it
will put a constraint on the building of new plants, because they won't
have any allowable emission limits at all. The idea was to allow these
credits to be traded back and forth, and if somebody wants to get into the
business, they can buy these things. If credits are not available to buy,
that's going to be a real problem.
QUESTION, Ms. H. Campbell: Can you comment on the
equivalent experience in the U.S. with regard to the environmental Bill of
Rights, if there is such a thing in the United States? Also, can you comment on the experience of citizen suits brought against enforcement
agencies in the United States?
ANSWER, Mr. Falsgraf: It's been argued whether there is a kind
of constitutional right to a clean environment. The answer is "no". The
idea is that the government has taken over the regulation of environmental contamination, so you don't have a private constitutional right.
There have been a number of efforts, both litigation and private efforts, to persuade or coerce -

whatever word you want to use -

compa-

nies to adopt a set of principles which include subscribing to, basically, a
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bill of environmental rights. My experience has been that the companies
are very reluctant to undertake that, not that they disagree with the philosophy, but they disagree with the particularity of the laundry list. It's
the old tort theory. You're not required to undertake an activity, but
once you undertake it, you have to do it properly, and you are held to a
standard of care. I think there's concern that these lists of initiatives are
so particular that they would impose a new unquantifiable level of liability, and companies are unwilling to undertake that.
With regard to your second question, until very recently, most of
the citizen suits have been actions to force the Agency to do a number of
things, specifically promulgate regulations, and they've been generally
successful holding it to a time limit. Congress, almost without exception,
poses time limits on the Agency within which it has to produce a certain
type of regulation. Invariably, it misses the deadline and gets sued.
More recently, the citizen suits have been expanded to include
things like suing a specific polluter. I haven't seen quite so many of
those, but I think you're going to see much more of them. The controlling factor is finances. Little by little, Congress has been adding provisions whereby citizen groups can get limited funding for technical help to
pursue these suits, and ultimately attorneys' fees, so the cost of litigation
can be reimbursed. That is a powerful incentive for the proliferation of
those suits.

